Introduction
The traditional model of mortgage default posits that borrowers default if and only if they have negative equity. A classic example is the option-based mortgage default model examined by Foster and Van Order (1984) in which default is a put option. Borrowers would exercise the put option when the value of the house plus any costs of exercising the option falls below the mortgage value. However, recent studies 2 have shown that many borrowers with negative equity do not necessarily default. These borrowers continue to honor their contractual obligation to the lenders even though their houses are worth less than the loans outstanding. These studies found that default is often associated with a negative income shock; i.e. being unemployed usually is a bigger factor than negative equity. Foote et al. (2009) found that a 1% increase in the unemployment rate raises the probability of default by 10-20%, while a 10% point fall in housing prices raises the probability of default by more than 50%. On the other hand, there have also been documented cases where borrowers have exercised the option to default when they have negative equity even though they could afford to pay their mortgages. Ashworth et al. (2010) concluded that negative equity shocks are far more important predictor of mortgage defaults than unemployment shocks. However, they also found that employment shocks can amplify the default rate if the borrower has already experienced a negative equity shock. As showed areas that experienced increased unemployment rates also experienced decline in house prices. As such, it is not easy to establish whether defaults in these areas are due to unemployment or house prices.
In this paper, we attempt to disentangle the interrelations between the home price index (which tracks housing prices) and unemployment shocks and mortgage default rates by studying the dynamics of these two shocks on mortgage default rates from 1979 to 2010. The 2001 to 2010 period represents a time when there have been significant changes in unemployment, house price indices and mortgage default rate at the same time. As such, this period presents a perfect period to empirically test which of these two shocks have had a bigger impact on mortgage default rates. We also want to know how the dynamics of the impacts of these two shocks in 2001 to 2010 have deviated from their historical dynamics (1979 to 2000) . Not only have there been significant changes in these three variables during the 2001 to 2010 period, underwriting standards also deteriorated significantly during the period as the growing number of subprime loans originated during this period shows. Incentives in the mortgage market also shifted to the "originate-to-distribute" model, under which mortgage brokers originated loans and then sold them to institutions that securitized them. Because these brokers do not have to bear the cost of default, they may not be stringent in screening potential mortgage borrowers (Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig, 2008) . About 700,000 subprime mortgage loans 3 were originated annually between 1998 and 2000 ; this increased to an average of 1.5 million between 2003 and 2006 annual. Lax underwriting standards were not the only factor in the increase in origination of subprime loans. A contributing factor was the house price appreciation after 2001 which made subprime origination easier as homeowners could easily resell their homes. documented that areas with high house price appreciation also experienced an increase in subprime mortgage origination.
Given the different composition of mortgage borrowers and the different types of mortgage loans originated during the two periods, a study of the impact of the unemployment and home price shocks on mortgage defaults over these two periods is necessary.
Mortgage default rates are influenced by the unemployment and home price shocks at the national, regional and state levels. However, describing the joint behavior of these three variables is not easy. This paper utilizes a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) to decompose the national, regional and state mortgage default rates into unemployment and home price index shocks. The data consist of unemployment rates, home price indices and mortgage default rates at the national, regional 4 , and state 5 levels covering a period from 1979 to 2010 at a quarterly frequency. The mortgage default rate is defined as the number of seriously delinquent mortgage loans as a percentage of all loans serviced in each quarter. The seriously delinquent loans are mortgage loans that are 90+ delinquent, i.e., they are loans for which the borrowers have not paid the mortgage in 90+ days. 
SVAR Model
The goal of the empirical analysis is to assess the impact of unemployment and home price index shocks on mortgage default rates. The SVAR system can be represented as: 
Short-Run Identification
In a short-run SVAR model, identification is obtained by placing restrictions on matrices which are assumed to be nonsingular. At least 3 identifying restrictions are needed to be imposed to achieve unique identification. We impose restrictions on the SVAR system by applying equality constraints with the constraint matrices:
) , the identification scheme implies that changes in the unemployment rates are not contemporaneously affected by the changes in the home price indices and the mortgage default rates. It also implies that changes in the mortgage default rates are affected by the contemporaneous changes in the unemployment rates (if ) but not the house price indices. Finally, it also implies that changes in the home price indices (if ) are affected by contemporaneous changes in the unemployment rates and the mortgage default rates (if ).
Contemporaneous Effects
We have enough restrictions that the innovations and the associated unique impulse responses are just-identified. We believe this identification strategy is reasonable: unemployed borrowers will experience difficulties paying their mortgages thereby leading to an increase in Unemployment Default Rate Home Price the default rate in the same quarter that they were unemployed, but borrowers who experience a negative equity do not make the decision to default in the same quarter. The second part was motivated by Deng, Quigley and Van Order (2000) , which empirically tested some mortgage default theories and found that borrowers do not default as soon as home equity becomes negative; they prefer to wait since default is irreversible and house prices may increase.
Data
The nine census regions are: Pacific Census Division (P), Mountain Census Division The unemployment rates were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Empirical Results
This section discusses the results of the forecast errors from 2001 to 2010 for the regional and national mortgage default rates using the SVAR estimates from 1979 to 2000.
Forecast Errors of Mortgage Default Rate: 2001 to 2010 Period
Given the SVAR system:
The optimal forecast (after ) of the system is given by:
The forecast error for the mortgage default rate is represented as:
Where is the national and regional mortgage default rate observed at time and ̂ ( ) is the forecasted national and regional mortgage default rate at time . 
Possible Reason for the Poor Fit during the Great Recession (A) Joint Structural Break Test
A possible explanation for the poor performance of the model during the Great Recession is that there might have been a structural change in the trivariate system during this period which the model could not have anticipated.
This section outlines a procedure for testing for such a structural break. The test is based on Lutkepohl (1989) .
Let the optimal forecast error of the SVAR system be represented as:
is the coefficient of the canonical MA representation of ; Equation (13) 11 . Because ( ), the forecast error is a linear transformation of a multivariate normal distribution and,
where:
( ) ∑ ̂ ̂ ̂ ( ) 12 is the forecast MSE matrix.
The optimal are also jointly normal: Lutkepohl (1989) showed that the power of a test based on joint variables may be lower than the power of a test based on the individual variables. Therefore we also run structural break tests for the national and regional mortgage default rates for the 2001 to 2010 period 14 .
Suppose that the mortgage default rates follow an ( ) stochastic process represented as:
Where is the lag operator, ( ) and ( )
. is a Gaussian white noise with variance .
The MA representation is 14 We know from the analysis of the forecast errors that, if there is a structural break in the mortgage default rate it will occur post 2000. 
National and Regions

̂
Analysis of the Dynamics of the Unemployment and Home Price Index shocks on the Mortgage Default Rate (National and Regional): 1979 to 2000 vs. 2001 to 2010
In this section we evaluate the impact of the home price index and unemployment shocks on the mortgage default rates by examining the impulse response functions and the variance decomposition from 1979 to 2000 and also from 2001 to 2010. Not only are we interested in the dynamics of the two shocks on the mortgage default rates during both periods; we also want to assess the relative importance of the shocks in explaining the variation in the mortgage default rates.
Orthogonalized Impulse Response
An MA representation of equation (3) 
Variance Decomposition
A variance decomposition is performed to measure the contribution of the home price and unemployment shocks to the changes in default rates. Using equation (13), the error optimal ahead forecast at time ̂ is: 
( ) ( ) ∑ ( ̂ )
This is the proportion of the forecast error variance error of variable accounted for by and innovations. We focus here on the proportion of the forecast error variance of the mortgage default rate accounted by the unemployment and home price index shocks.
Home Price Index and Unemployment Data: 2000 to 2010
The 2000 to 2010 period represents a time of significant changes in unemployment and house prices. Table 3 presents the percentage appreciation and depreciation of the house price index at the national and regional levels from 2000 to 2010. 16 The table shows some variations across the regions of the extent of house price appreciation and depreciation during this period.
House prices in the Pacific region had the largest appreciation and also the largest depreciation during this period. There has not being significant house price depreciation in the West North Central, West South Central and East South Central regions. The East North Central region had the smallest house price appreciation but one of the largest house price depreciation. Housing prices in New England and Middle Atlantic experienced large appreciation, but not significant depreciation. 16 This period was chosen because it has the highest home price index and also the period when the index depreciated (measuring from the peak value) the most. The window is wide enough to observe the scale of house price appreciation for the regions and the subsequent collapse in house prices for some of the regions. 
National and Regions
Impulse Response Functions
This section presents the results of the impulse response functions for the mortgage 18 respectively to an increase of one standard deviation in the home price index and the unemployment rate. In response to the unemployment shocks, the national and regional mortgage default rates increase and they take about 15 quarters after the shocks to get back to their pre shock level. The home price shocks are unchanged in the period of impact because of our identification scheme, which implied that it takes more than a quarter for the home price index shocks to have an impact on the mortgage default rates. In response to the home price index shocks the national and regional mortgage default rates decrease and they also take about 15 quarters to get back to its pre shock level. The national and regional mortgage default dynamics after the shocks seem to be similar; however, there are regional variations in the peaks and troughs of the impulse response functions. 18 The dynamics of the other regions are similar to those reported here.
National and Regions Lowest Unemployment rate Highest unemployment rate National
East Table 5 reports the peak and trough of the national and regional mortgage default rates after the unemployment and home price index shocks. From 1979 to 2000 the national unemployment and home price index shocks led to a maximum increase of 1.3% and a decrease of 1% in the national mortgage default rates respectively. For the regions the unemployment and home price index shocks led to an average increase of 1.2% and a decrease of 1.1% in the regional mortgage default rate respectively. Compared to the 2001 to 2010 period, the national unemployment and the home price index shocks led to maximum increase of 7.2% and a decrease of 4.9% in the national mortgage default rate respectively. For the regions, the unemployment and the home price index shocks led to an average increase of 12.7% and a decrease of 7.3% respectively. Although there have been a lot of changes in the unemployment rate at both the national and regional levels during the 1979 to 2000 period, these changes did not seem to have impacted the national and regional mortgage default rates that much. The results for the home price index during this period are not surprising because the indices did not change much during the period.
For the 2001 to 2010 period, the unemployment results for the East South Central (which had one of the highest unemployment rates at 11.1%) and West South Central (influenced by Louisiana in particular) were mainly driven by the effects of hurricane Katrina. These two regions were among the regions with the smallest house price index appreciation and depreciation (Table 3) ; however the house price shocks seem to have generated a big impact on the mortgage default rates.
Overall the response to the unemployment shocks is larger than the response to the home price index shocks.
Table 5
This table reports the peak and trough of the impulse response functions of the national and regional mortgage default rates due to a one standard deviation increase in the national and regional unemployment rate and the national and regional home price indices. 
National and
Variance Decomposition
To gauge the relative contributions of the unemployment and the home price index shocks to the variance of the mortgage default rates during both the 1979 to 2000 and the 2001 to 2010 periods; the variance decompositions are constructed for the SVAR system using Equation (17) at ( ) and ( ) 19 . Table 6 The empirical results show that unemployment shocks have been a bigger contributor to national and regional mortgage default rates than the home price index shocks. 
Dynamics of Some Selected States
The dynamics of the home price index and unemployment shocks on the mortgage default rates were examined for Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan, Nevada, and Pennsylvania. These states have had mortgage default rates higher than the national average.
Some of the states (Michigan, Nevada and Pennsylvania) have also had unemployment rates higher than the national average. Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan and Nevada have also experienced some of the biggest drop in housing prices during the 2001 to 2010 period.
Home Price Index and Unemployment Data: 2000 to 2010
From Table 7 Florida had the largest appreciation in the house price index from 2000 to 2010 and also one of the largest house price index depreciations during the period. Michigan had one of the lowest appreciations in the house price index, but also one of the largest house price index depreciation during the period. Nevada had the largest depreciation in the home price index. Michigan had the smallest home price appreciation but a large home price index depreciation. There does not seem to be have been much depreciation in housing prices in Pennsylvania. , document that areas with high house price appreciation experienced an increase in subprime mortgage origination. also showed that in California, Florida, Arizona and Nevada over half of subprime borrowers had negative equity in their home and over a third of borrowers in Michigan had negative equity by mid-2008 The results show that there have been significant increases in the unemployment rates for these states during this period. With the exception of Pennsylvania, all the states have their highest unemployment rates above the highest national unemployment rate and also larger house price index depreciation than the national. Again, these states present a perfect sample to test the relative significance of home price index and unemployment shocks on the mortgage default rate. 
Impulse Response Functions
This section presents the results of the impulse response functions for the mortgage default for the 1979 to 2000 and 2001 to 2010 samples.
Figures 9 to 14 represents the dynamics of the impulse response functions of the mortgage default rates for the states to an increase of one standard deviation in the home price index and the unemployment rate. The dynamics of the states' mortgage default rates after the unemployment and home price shocks are similar to the dynamics of the national and regional mortgage default rates after the shocks. That is, in response to the unemployment shocks the states mortgage default rates increase and they take about 15 quarters after the shocks to get back to its pre shock level. The home price shocks are also unchanged in the period of impact due to the implication of our identification scheme. In response to the home price index shocks the states mortgage default rates decrease and for some of the states it takes about 20 quarters to get back to their pre shock level during the 2001 to 2010 period. However, for these selected states the peak and trough of the impulse response functions are higher and lower for the unemployment and home price index shocks respectively. rates than the home price index shocks at both the one and two year horizon. As Tables 7 and 8 shows, there have been significant changes in both the unemployment rates and the home price indices, but the changes in the unemployment rate on average explained more of the variation in the state mortgage default rates than the changes in the home price indices.
Policies that aim to decrease the default rates across the states should take into account the relative impact of the two shocks in explaining the variation in the mortgage default rate. If home price should dominate, then government programs that reduce the overall principal might be beneficial for that state. By contrast, if unemployment shocks dominate, reduction in payments (or subsidization mortgage payments) might be the better policy for the state. 
Conclusion
The increase in mortgage default rates over the last several years has created a renewed interest in the factors drive mortgage defaults. There has been an increase in the number of subprime loans originated after 2003, due to lax mortgage underwriting standards. This has increase the number of borrowers who are more susceptible to unemployment and negative home price shocks. These borrowers have little savings they could use to cushion them against unemployment and negative home price shocks. Studies have drawn conflicting conclusions as to which of these two factors have accounted for the most of the variation in the mortgage default rates. There is an important policy implications for how best to help home owners under water depending on which factor dominates. As Elul et al (2010) stated if negative equity dominates, then government programs that reduce the overall principal might be beneficial. By contrast, if unemployment shocks should dominate, reduction in payments (or subsidization mortgage payments) might be the better policy.
The paper uses an SVAR model to disentangle the interrelations between the home price index (which tracks housing prices) and unemployment shocks and mortgage default rates by studying the dynamics of these two shocks on mortgage default rates from 1979 to 2010 at the national, regional and state levels. The results show that, with the exception of the Pacific region, California and Florida, unemployment shocks explain more of the variation in the mortgage default rates than home price indices shock at the national, regional and state levels, especially, during the 2001 to 2010 period. These two shocks together are responsible on average for about 60% of the movement in the regional mortgage default rates.
